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Section 704 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act1 authorizes the
Food and Drug Administration to conduct inspections of regulated business
establishments. In the statute. Congress required that the inspections be at
reasonable times and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner.
2Congress further restricted the inspections from including general nancial and
personnel data, and research data not relating to specially regulated drugs.3
The inspections authorized by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act are an extremely important tool for FDA enforcement. In 1989,
FDA conducted 17,740 factory inspections.4 The FDA enforcement scheme is
premised on the belief that most businesses wiii comply with regulations volun-
tarily5 Litigation. as a primary enforcement tool, would waste much time and
money on a ew individual cases while leaving the rest of the industry without
policing or even information concerning legal duties~ Inspections, however, al-
low FDA ocers to point out to businesses any regulatory infractions. Business
owners, in the majority of cases, can then correct the infractions voluntarily.
The Federal Food. Drug and Cosmetic Act does not require FDA
121 U.S.C. 374.
221 U.S.C. 374 (aUI)(D).
3~Id. See ~505(i). 505(j), 507(d), 507(g). 519. and 520(g) for the more specic drug
provisions.
4Peter B> Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 1205
(2nd ed.. 1991)
5Edward 3. Allera. Wdrrantless Inspections of the Food Industry, 34 Food Drug Cosm.
L.J. 260, 267 (1979).
1to get warrants prior to inspections. Although Congress authorized warrantless
administrative inspections in the statute6 the FDA has to deal with constitu-
tional constraints as well. The Fourth Amendment protects the people of the
United States7 against unreasonable searches and provides that no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or armation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched.
FDA has avoided the general constitutional requirement of a war-
rant prior to a search through the pervasively regulated industry' exception.
This paper will examine rst the history of the exception and how the FDA has
operated within it. I will then look at some recent cases involving the exception
and the impact, if any, that they will have on FDA policy.
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided two companion cases involving
warrantless administrative searches.8 In each case the Court upheld the prop-
erty owner's right to refuse entry to an inspector.9 Most importantly, the Court
held that unless the inspector receives the property owner's consent, he must
have a warrant to conduct an administrative search.10 The Court mitigated the
warrant requirement for administrative searches by dening a lesser probable
cause standard for administrative inspections than that used for criminal search
warrants. Rather than needing specic reason to believe that the particular
6Hutt and Merrill. supra note 4, at 1045 (quoting Peter B. Hutt. Philosophy of Regulation
under the Federal Food. Drug and Cosmetic Act, 28 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 177 (1973)).
7u.s. Const. amend. IV.
8Prior to 1967. the Court had not applied the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment to civil inspections at all. See Lynn S. Searie, The Administrative Search from Dewey
to Burger: Dismantling the Fourth Amendment, 16 Hastings Const. L.Q. 261 (1989).
9Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), involved the inspection of a private
residence for violations of the San Francisco Housing code. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541 (1967), involved a similar administrative search but with a commercial establishment.
10See Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
2building to be searched was in violation, probable cause for the inspection could
be based on the reasonable goals of code enforcement.11 For the requisite prob-
able cause, the agency seeking the warrant need only show that a valid public
interest justies the intrusion 12
Three years later, the Court laid the foundation for the pervasively
regulated industry exception. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States13
the Internal Revenue Service searched a catering business which had a liquor
license.14 The IRS agents did not have a warrant and the owner did not consent
to the search. The Court held that, because the liquor industry had long been
regulated. Congress did have the power to authorize warrantless searches in the
regulatory schemes that it passed.15
In 1972. a pawn shop operator challenged a warrantless search
conducted pursuant to the Gun Control Act of 1968.16 Citing Colonnade, the
Court upheld the search. There was no forced entry. and the ocers stayed
within their statutory right of inspection. The Court noted that there would
be no question of the validity of the search if the business in this case had been
in the liquor industry.17 The Court admitted that the gun industry does not
have the same history of regulation that the liquor industry does. It relied on
111d. at 535.
12Id at 539.
13397 U.S. 72 (1970).
14Colonnade was the rst case of a warrantless inspection conducted pursuant to a federal
statute. See Edward M. Basile. The Case Law on Inspect ions. 34 Food Drug Cosm. L. 3.
20. 22(1'~79)
15Colonnade. 397 U.S. at 76. The Court overruled the specic search in this case because
the statute, while authorizing a warrantless search, did not authorize the agents to make a
forcible entry.
16Jnited States v. Biswell. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
171d at 314 o15.
3the extensive regulation and the important government interest in regulating
rearms to prevent violent crime18 [U]nannounced, even frequent, inspections
are essential to eective enforcement and deterrence; and a person involved in
this pervasively regulated business must expect periodic inspections.19
The Court focused on the statutory scheme as it dismissed Bisweil's
argument that his consent to the search was not voluntary. Unlike the Camara
and See standard, the Biswell court held that neither consent nor a warrant
were necessary. When inspecting a business in a pervasively regulated industry,
the legality of the search depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid
statute.20
Together. Colonnade and Biswell rmly established the perva-
sively regulated industry exception to the warrant requirement for administra-
tive searches. The FDA responded to these cases by adopting the policy that
warrants were not necessary for inspections, even when consent was refused.21
Subsequently, several district court decisions upheld the FDA's opinion that its
regulatory inspections t into the Colonnade o Biswell exception for pervasively
regulated industries.22 Marshall v. Barlow's. inc.23 was the next important
181d. at 315.
191d. at 316.
20Id. at 315. The only indication as to what would constitute a search pursuant to a valid
statute was the Court's requirement that it be carefully limited in time, place, and scope. Id.
The Court would have to further dene this issue in later cases. See infra. notes 48 o50, 62
and accompanying text.
21eborah B. Norton. The Constitutionality of Warrantless Inspections by the Food and Drug
Administration, 35 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 25, 33 (1980). FDA had rst instructed
its inspectors to seek warrants when consent was refused after the Camara and See
decisions in 1967. See Id. at 30.
22See, e.g., United States v. Business Builders..35.3 F.Supp. 1333 ~D.D.C. 1973); United
States v. Del Campo, 354 F.Supp. 141(ND. Okla. 1973). But see United States v. I. D.
Russell Labs. 439 F.Supp. 711 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (relying on Camara and See in requiring a
warrant, and mentioning neither Colonnade or Biswell)
23436 U.S. 307 (1978).
4decision for the pervasively regulated industry exception. The
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) attempted
to inspect an electrical and plumbing plant, but the owner refused to let the in-
spectors in. OSHA argued that its inspections were authorized by statute24 and
that these inspections did not require warrants because the Colonnade oBiswell
doctrine authorized warrantiess inspections of pervasively regulated businesses.25
According to OSHA, its regulation of health and safety conditions constituted
pervasive regulation.
Although the Court accepted the pervasively regulated business
exception of the Biswell case, it rejected OSHA's broadening of the exception.
To t this exception, the Court held, regulation of the industry must be so
extensive and of such long tradition that any person who chooses to enter such
a business must already be aware of the extent of the regulation.26 OSHA did
not regulate the electrical and plumbing industry, but rather the general health
and safety conditions of workplaces in all industries.27 OSHA's regulation of
workplace safety simply was not involved enough to be pervasive, neither was
it adequate to give notice of inspections to the aected businesses. The Court
atly refused to expand the exception, as OSHA requested, to allow warrantless
administrative searches of all businesses involved in interstate commerce.
The FDA did not change its policy in the wake of Barlow's, but
2429 U.S.C. 657. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of1970 neither required a warrant
nor explicitly excepted OSHA inspections from the general warrant requirement. Its limits
of reasonableness and notice were actually very similar to the inspection provisions of the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. See supra note 1.
25Barlow's. 436 U.S. 307.
261d. at 313.
271d
5commentators disagreed, about the implications Barlow's would have for FDA
policy. The primary lesson of Marshall v. Barlow's was that the Colon-
nade oBiswell exception is the exception, only for pervasively regulated indus-
tries, and not the rule for all somewhat regulated businesses. Edward Basile. the
then Assistant Chief Counsel for Enforcement at the FDA, said in a 1979 article
that the Court recognized the continuing vitality of the Biswell and Colonnade
exceptions to the search warrant requirement for 'pervasively regulated busi-
nesses' and merely rejected OSHA's proposed application of these exceptions.28
In Basile's opinion, Barlow's would have no eect on the FDA because FDA's
regulatory scheme t easily within Barlow's rubric for the pervasively regulated
business exception. The Federal Food. Drug and Cosmetic Act is addressed to
particular industries, the FDA has a long history of closely supervising those
industries, and the whole statutory scheme and its history provides notice to
businessmen of the regulatory burdens that accompany doing business in those
industries.29
On the other hand, Deborah B. Norton concluded a 1980 article
that Barlow's called into question much of FDA enforcement poiicy.30 Norton
argued that, while some FDA o regulated industries were clearly pervasively
regulated businesses, many others were not. Barlow's did not begin to sort them
out.31 Although the FDA did not change its policy in response to Barlow's. it
28asile, supra note 14, at 24 o25.
291d at 27.
30orton. supra note 21.
31orton actually argued that FDA should require warrants for all inspections after Barlow's
because the analysis of each individual industry which FDA regulates would be so complex
and costly. Congress could then examine each industry's enforcement diculties as needed.
See Id. at 38.
6did believe that Barlow's left the validity of warrantless FDA inspections as an
open question.32
The debate over where Barlow's left the FDA was quickly resolved.
In a 1981 case.33 executives of a drug company charged with counterfeit-
ing, adulteration, and misbranding drugs argued that their Fourth Amendment
rights had been violated. The threshold question was whether the drug omanufacturing
industry should be included within this class of closely regulated businesses.34
The Court held that the drug industry did t the exception, noting the history
of heavy regulation, the urgent public ohealth interests at stake, the diculties
of enforcement, and the statute's provisions which were more narrow than those
at issue in Barlow's.
Both United States v. New England Grocers Supply Co.35 and
United States v. Gel Spice Co., Inc.36 involved FDA inspections of food ware-
houses in 1976 and 1977. The courts upheld the inspections under Biswell; the
defendants then appealed those judgments in the light of the 1978 Barlow's
decision. [Gliven the pervasive nature and long history of federal regulation of
the food and drug industry, considering that, in contrast to the situation in
Barlow's. these regulations apply to a particular industry and not a wide range
of business establishments, and mindful of the urgent public health interests
that are served by the inspections, the New England Grocers court upheld the
325ee id. at 35 & n.70. The prominence of the FDA statutory scneme and case law in the
Barlow's briefs combined with the lack of their mention in the Court's opinion causes one to
wonder whether the Court may have deliberately left this question open.
33bnited States v. Jamieson oMcKames Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 651 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1981).
34Id. at 536.
354ee F.Supp. 230 (1980).
36601 F.Supp. 1214 (1985).
7inspection as tting within the pervasively regulated business exception.37The
Gel Spice inspection was upheld on the same grounds 38
Although the district court food industry decisions of New Eng-
land Grocers and Gel Spice are not as authoritative as the circuit court drug
industry decision of Jamieson oMcKames. there has been no real debate in this
area since Gel Spice: these cases squarely placed the national food and drug
industries within the pervasively regulated business exception. However, as
the above debate between Basile and Norton illustrates, Colonnade, B.zswell,
and Barlow's had failed to clearly dene the parameters of the exception. Later
cases rst elaborated on the standards alluded to in Barlow's and then expanded
the scope of the exception. New York v. Burger,39 in particular, loosened the
requirements for the pervasively regulated industry exception.
Prior to Burger, and shortly after Barlow's, the Supreme Court
examined the exception in Donovan v. Dewey.40 The procedural situation was
not wholly dierent from that in
Barlow's: in Barlow's, an inspection pursuant to the Occupational
Safety and Health Act had been invalidated; in Dewey, a dierent statute's
warrantless inspection provision o o the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act o owas
challenged. In this case. the Court upheld the application of the pervasively
37New England Grocers. 488 F.Supp. at 238. As early as1909, the Supreme Court recog-
nized the duty of the State to protect and guard. as far as possible, the lives and health of
its inhabitants... (from] food which is unt for human consumption. North American Storage
Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. at315 (1909).
38Gel Spice, 601 F.Supp. at 1229. Contra United States v. Roux Laboratories, Inc., 456
F.Supp. 973 (1978) (an early post o Barlow's decision requiring warrants for FDA inspections)
394e2 U.S. 691 (1987).
40452 U.S. 594 (1981).
8regulated business exception to the mining industry, one of the most hazardous
in the country.41 The opinion focused on the extent of the regulation and
its eect on the expectations of privacy rather than on a long history of the
regulation.42
Dewey not only expanded the Colonnade oBiswell exception to in-
clude the mining industry; it also outlined clearer standards for the exception
than had been provided in previous cases.43 In 1987, the Court revisited the
Dewey standards in New York v.
Burger.44 The defendant in Burger was a junkyard owner who challenged a
search conducted pursuant to New York state trac law.45 Police ocers had
inspected the junkyard after Burger admitted that he did not have the required
administrative records. When the search revealed stolen vehicles and parts, they
arrested Burger for possession of stolen property.46 The defendant contended
that the ~415 oa5 authorization of warrantless inspections was unconstitutional;
the state argued that the junkyard business was a pervasively regulated indus-
try and that warrantless inspections were appropriate. The Court upheld the
statute and the search.
The Court rst held that a junkyard was a closely regulated busi-
ness and that the owner had a reduced expectation of privacy.47 The Court
411d. at 602.
42.Td. at 606.
43secause the focus of recent debate has been on Burger. I will discuss the specics of the
Dewey standards in the discussion of Burger.
44U.S. 691 (1987).
45Y. Veh. & Traf. Law ~4l5 oa5 (McKinney 1986).
46Burger. 487 U.S. at 694 o95.
47at 707. (See also 703 o07 for the Court's support for this holding. Automobile junkyards
are subject to detailed licensing, registration, and record okeeping regulations. Though Dewey
did not focus on the duration of the regulation, it is relevant. The salvage industry has long
9then examined three other criteria expressed in Dewey and held that the state
met them in Burger. According to Dewey. warrantless inspections of perva-
sively regulated businesses (1) must serve a substantial government interest,
(2) must be a necessary enforcement tool, and (3) the statute must provide
a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.48 The Court found that
deterrence of automobile theft was the substantial government interest at work
in the regulation and that the surprise element of warrantless inspections was
a necessary weapon in ghting automobile theft.49 Finally, the Court held that
the New York statute provided the requisite substitute for a warrant in that its
procedure was specic and limited enough to give the junkyard owner notice of
the search and its scope, and it restricted the discretion of inspectors.50
After the question of the pervasively regulated industry exception.
Burger also examined the question of whether an administrative search which
may disclose criminal as well as civil violations raises constitutional diculties.51
The Court argued that an administrative scheme that serves narrow regulatory
goals may very well serve the same ultimate purposes as a parallel penal law.52
The Court rejected this challenge to the Burger search as well, holding that the
discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administra-
tive inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme
suspect.'53
been regulated: automobile junkyards are simply a new specialty within that old industry.)
48at 702 o03 (citing Dewey)
49Id. at 708, 710.
501d. at 703, 711.
511d. at 693.
521d. at 712 o13.
53Id. at 716. Cf. United States v. Branson. 21 F.3d 113 (6th Cir. 1994) (allowing into
10This issue of overlapping criminal ocivil violations has been the fo-
cus of post oBurger cases. Although agencies are unlikely to have their admin-
istrative inspections declared illegal under the pervasively regulated business
analysis of Burger. subsequent cases indicate that warrantless administrative
searches which serve as a pretext for criminal investigations will often not be
upheld.54
Commentators have been seriously concerned about the expansive
nature of Burger. Although the Court used the same doctrinal language in
Burger that it had used in Dewey. the Court would have provided far more
protection for the defendant's constitutional rights had it actually followed the
Dewey standards.55 As Brennan points out in his dissent, the tests articulated
in Dewey were interpreted far more broadly in Burger: the registration and
record okeeping regulations of the junkyard industry are a far cry from the per-
vasive mine safety regulations of Dewey. With this broad interpretation, most
businesses t the pervasively regulated exception, and the warrant requirement
of See has been constructively overruled.56
More than the Court's distortion of the Dewey test, commenta-
tors have decried Burger's emasculation of privacy interests under the Fourth
Amendment57 The Court expanded the scope of the pervasively regulated busi-
evidence marijuana plants discovered during administrative search of auto repair shop).
54United States v. Seslar. 996 F.2d 1058 (10th Cir. 1993) (suppressing evidence obtained
through stop of rental truck with no justication for criminal stop or administrative search);
United States v. Johnson. 994 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1993) (reversing conviction for illegal
possession of wild animals because administrative search of taxidermy shop was solely for the
purposes of a criminal smuggling investigation).
55See Searle, supra note 8.
56Burger, 482 U.S. at 721 (Brennan, 3., dissenting).
57generally Searle, supra note 8; John S. Morgan. The Junking of the Fourth Amendment:
Illinois v. Krull and New York v. Burger, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 335 (1988).
11ness exception by linking Fourth Amendment privacy interests with
the amount of regulation and by taking an insignicant view of the individual's
privacy interests. For example, an element of surprise would benet any en-
forcement eort. The Court's reliance on the necessity of surprise58 is weak and
ignores legitimate privacy interests. 59The Court argued that operation of a
closely regulated business leads to reduced expectations of privacy which leads
to less warrant and probable cause protection.60 This reasoning 'cancels the
petitioner's commercial fourth amendment rights simply because he operates
a closely regulated business.61 Thus, Congress need only increase the regu-
lation of an industry to provide the basis for warrantless inspections. Under
the Burger scheme. virtually any statue would pass constitutional muster if
the industry is heavily regulated and the search occurs during business hours.
62That hardly sounds like the notice and limited discretion of a constitutionally
adequate warrant.
Although Burger opens the door for many abuses of Fourth Amend-
ment rights, it will actually have very little eect on FDA enforcement policy.63
There are two main reasons for this lack of impact. The rst is that most busi-
nesses consent to FDA inspections, and warrants are never required when the
proprietor consents. The Camara and See decisions required very little change
58See Burger, 482 U.S. at 710; supra note 49 and accompanying text.
59v!organ, supra note 57, at 372.
605ee Burger, 482 U.S. at 701 o02.
614organ, supra note 57, at 363.
62Id:
63Jeither Morgan nor Searle discussed Burger in the context of FDA enforcement. One is
hard opressed to nd a federal court citing Burger in an FDA case. Contra United States v.
Fogari. 1987 o1988 FDLI Jud. Rec. 144 (D.N.J. 1988) (cited in Hutt and Merrill,
supra note 4, at 1107, note 3.).
12in FDA policy for precisely this reason. Inspectors were told to continue busi-
ness oas ousual' and to seek warrants only when businesses refused to consent.64
The second reason that FDA is not impacted by Burger is that the
FDA already had the power which Burger gave to regulatory agencies. There
was never any real question about whether FDA inspections qualied for the
pervasively regulated industry exception.65 Barlow's raised a minor question
because it limited the exception; however, Burger can only be read to expand
the exception so it does not threaten FDA.
Moreover, even if post oBurger cases were to narrow the view of the
criteria for warrantless inspections, the FDA would be unaected because its
regulatory scheme meets the requirements. The substantial government interest
in food and drug safety is well oestablished.66 Much more than the registration
scheme of the New York state trac law, the Federal Food. Drug and Cos-
metic Act provides specic provisions concerning scope and discretion and the
notice of regular inspections that substitute for the constitutional warrant re-
quirement. Without unannounced inspections, harmful drugs and food could be
destroyed or even released to the public before FDA employees could discover
them. Edward Basile goes even further on this issue and argues that warrant-
less inspections are necessary for administrative cost and manpower reasons. If
warrants were required when a business refused consent, as little as a 1% initial
refusal rate could result in FDA employees and Assistant United States Attor-
neys appearing before magistrates all over the country about twice every court
64Norton, supra note 21, at 30.
65See supra notes 21 o22, 33 o38 and accompanying text.
66See, e.g., supra note 37.
13date.67
Even in the area of criminal sanctions, Burger will not aect FDA
enforcement. FDA regulation certainly raises the issue of joint civil and criminal
investigations and penalties. But the FDA rarely uses its criminal sanctions.68
Where the FDA does impose criminal sanctions, the current 'good faith' stan-
dard for challenging evidence obtained in an administrative search is very di-
cult to meet.69 A defendant cannot even get a hearing on the issue without a
preliminary showing of bad faith. To establish bad faith, defendants must show
that the sole purpose of the investigation was investigatory, rather than regu-
latory.70 It is virtually inconceivable that a defendant could show the complete
absence of any regulatory purpose in an FDA administrative search.
To conclude, the law allowing the FDA to conduct warrantless ad-
ministrative searches is well oestablished and not currently in debate. FDA
authority seems unaected by recent developments which may redene the per-
vasively regulated business exception. Thus, the FDA is free to continue with
business as usual as it protects the safety of our food and drug supply.
67Basile, supra note 14. at 27.
68See Hutt and Merrill, supra note 4, at 1205. The incidence of criminal prosecutions
by the FDA steadily and dramatically decreased from 1939. There were only 16 criminal
prosecutions by FDA in 1989.
69See Gel Spice, 601 F.Supp. 1214, 1218 (1985).
70Id. (emphasis added)
14